The proper function of thymoeidés in the Republic

Authors

Keywords:

thymós, action, reason, appetites

Abstract

The just person controls his appetites by virtue of an alliance between his rational and spirited parts: while the first determines the object of the action, the second gives stability and strength to the prescription of reason. This essay aims to show that the spirited part can give strength to reason’s orders, only if it also receives value (i.e. the restoration of the individual’s damaged image). From this, I argue that the spirited part (i) always takes the side of reason in the conflict with appetites (as enemies of the individual’s freedom) and, nevertheless, (ii) it can oppose [to] reason when the appetitive part is not at stake (and the claim of restoration, i.e. revenge, is repressed by reason).

References

Este artículo forma parte del proyecto de investigación Fondecyt Iniciación N° 11190645 (esta información tiene que estar en alguna parte del artículo).

Published

2021-10-13

Issue

Section

Articles