Resumo: A justificativa para colocar o fragmento 3 (DK28B3) de Parmênides na “Verdade” é fraca, e tanto a sua ambiguidade quanto a sua capacidade de gerar interpretações radicalmente distintas sugerem que ele pertence a “Doxa”. O artigo analisa as fontes do fragmento (Clemente, Plotino e Proclo), bem como as circunstâncias de sua inclusão tardia em qualquer colação (1835), e argumenta que o debate ainda em curso entre a leitura de Diels e a leitura do fragmento introduzida por Zeller surgem da pressuposição – até esta data inquestionada – de que ele pertença à “Verdade”. O principal objetivo do artigo não é resolver este famoso dilema interpretativo, tampouco reinterpretar B3 no interior da “Doxa”, mas antes desestabilizar a visão atualmente inquestionada de que ele pertença à “Verdade”, e pôr em questão todas as interpretações globais de Parmênides que fazem de B3 um componente central.


Abstract: The justification for placing Parmenides fr. 3 (DK 28B3) in “Truth” is weak, and both its ambiguity and capacity to generate radically different interpretations suggest that it belongs to “Doxa.” The paper analyzes the fragment’s sources (Clement, Plotinus, and Proclus), the circumstances of its belated entry into any collection (1835), and argues that the ongoing debate between the reading of Diels and the reading of it introduced by Zeller arises from the presupposition—heretofore unquestioned—that it belongs in “Truth.” The paper’s principal purpose is not to settle this famous interpretive dilemma nor to reinterpret B3 within “Doxa,” but rather to destabilize the currently unquestioned view that it belongs in “Truth,” and to call into question any global interpretations of Parmenides that make B3 a central component.

Keywords: Parmenides, Plato, Sophist, Mourelatos, Heidegger, Plotinus, Proclus.

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This paper’s purpose is to challenge the uncritical presumption that the fragment we now call “B3” deserves its current place in the section of Parmenides’ poem that reveals ἀλήθεια (“Truth”). The ancient testimony provides no justification for this placement, and any internal evidence based on the other fragments of the poem is debatable. To prove that this is the case, I will offer some reasons for moving it to the section of the poem devoted to “the opinions of mortals” (“Doxa”). While either placement leaves important questions unanswered, interpretations of Parmenides that depend on the reigning assumption that B3 belongs in “Truth” should hereafter be regarded with suspicion.

The paper will consist of seven sections: §1 will briefly review the late entry of B3 into our collections of the fragments, and §2 will review the ancient sources. Section §3 will show how an ongoing debate about the syntax of B3 depends on the presumption that it must be squared with the rest of “Truth,” and thus how moving it to “Doxa” would resolve that debate. In section §4, I will indicate why B3, quite apart from the syntactic problems that have led to the controversy described in §3, is well adapted to express the opinion of “two-headed mortals” (βροτοὶ δίκρανοι). §5 will use the path-breaking work of Alexander Mourelatos—who judiciously refused to base his reading of Parmenides on B3—to explain what is at stake in moving the fragment to “Doxa.” In §6, the testimony of Theophrastus will show how B3 may have been closely connected to B16 in “Doxa,” and §7 will consider the fragment in the context of Plato, whose Sophist in particular plays an important role in the fragment’s transmission through both Plotinus and Proclus.

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2 B6.4-5; references to the text of Parmenides will be numbered on the basis of DK following the readings of Alexander P. D. Mourelatos. The Route of Parmenides, revised and expanded edition. Las Vegas: Parmenides, 2008.
3 Mourelatos, Route, xxi: “Irremediable syntactic ambiguity in the case of B3 and B6.1-2, and similar ambiguities coupled with total loss of context in the case of B4, make gratuitous any attempt to use these lines as the starting point or basis for an interpretation of Parmenides.” See section §4 for my response to B3’s “syntactic ambiguity.”
§1. INCLUDING B3

Although collecting the fragments of Parmenides began during the Renaissance,\(^4\) B3 was included in a collection of them for the first time in 1835.\(^5\) There are several good reasons for its late entry: unlike other fragments of the poem, it is not a complete hexameter, and neither Clement nor Plotinus—aside from Proclus, our only sources for it—offers any kind of explanation, or even hint, as to where in the poem it belongs.\(^6\) The writings of Plotinus were well known,\(^7\) and given that Clement is the source for B4,\(^8\) and Proclus (along with Simplicius) is the source for B2—both of which were included in the first collection made by Henri Estienne—\(^9\) it probably makes more sense to speak of an initial ‘exclusion’ of B3 rather than of anyone’s failure to include it: its existence was certainly known to the early collectors. It is significant that when it finally entered Simon Karsten’s collection, it did not do so in isolation, but rather as joined to B2, which ended with a partial line of the proper metrical dimensions.\(^10\)

It was therefore not the ‘discovery’ of B3, but rather the discovery of its metrical ‘compatibility’ with the end of B2, that simultaneously overcame the two principal reasons for its earlier exclusion: it was now no longer an incomplete line and its place in the poem had apparently become clear. Hermann Diels followed Karsten’s lead: although he gave the fragment its own number—first “B5”

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\(^6\) This important point cannot be emphasized too much. For awareness of it, see, for example, John Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 118-122, especially: “the ancient authors who quoted and thereby preserved the fragment [sc. B3] for us give no reliable indication either of its original position and context in Parmenides’ poem” (p. 118) and “the original context and purpose of this declaration [sc. B3] unfortunately remain unclear” (p. 122).

\(^7\) Editio princeps 1580 (ed. Pietro Perna), Latin translation by Ficino.

\(^8\) DK, p. 332.

\(^9\) DK, p. 331.


and then “B3”\textsuperscript{12}—he too considered it the completion (respectively) of “B4” and “B2.”\textsuperscript{13} It is therefore not without historical significance that among the modifications made by Malcolm Schofield in the revised edition of Kirk and Raven is at least the nucleus of a compelling argument for disjoining B3 from B2:\textsuperscript{14} what Schofield does not mention is the fact that, from a historical perspective, severing the two fragments tends to restore B3 to the limbo which it inhabited before Karsten.\textsuperscript{15} It deserves mention that there have been calls for the entire exclusion of B3,\textsuperscript{16} a considerably more radical proposal than the one I will be offering. And it should also be noted that even though B3 will be treated here as if it were a complete clause, there is no proof that it actually is one.

\section*{§2. The Sources of B3}

Clement of Alexandria is our earliest source for B3,\textsuperscript{17} and he includes it in a chapter documenting the proclivity of Greek writers to plagiarize.\textsuperscript{18} With

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Cf. Hermann Diels. \textit{P"armenides Lehrgedicht; Griechisch und Deutsch}. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1897, pp. 32-33 and DK, pp. 231-232.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Cf. Diels. \textit{P"armenides Lehrgedicht}, p. 67 (“h"ochst wahrscheinlich direct an 4, 8 [i.e., DK B2.8] anschliessend”), and DK, p. 231, on B2: “B3 schließt an.”
  \item \textsuperscript{15} The general phenomenon deserves independent consideration. As for the specific case at issue, even Martin J. Henn, who defends the B2/B3 graft against Schofield, admits the need for a “missing premise” in his \textit{P"armenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretive Essays and Commentary to the Text}. Westport: Praeger, 2003, p. 53: “If we assume that B2 immediately precedes B3, then B3 serves as the premise for the assertion of B2; but even so, the reasoning is still enthymematic. We must supply a missing premise to understand the flow.”
  \item \textsuperscript{17} In addition to B4 at \textit{Stromata} 5.15.5, Clement corroborates Sextus Empiricus for two important lines of B1 (29-30) at 5.59.6—where he calls P"armenides ὁ μέγας; cf. 5.112.2—and is our source for B10 at 5.138.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} τὸ κλεπτικόν at \textit{Stromata} 6.2.5. For the ground covered in this section, cf. Donna M. Giancola. Toward a Radical Reinterpretation of Parmenides’ B3. \textit{Journal of Philosophical Research}, v. 26, 2001, p. 635-653, on pp. 636-638. This important article will receive further attention in section §7.
Herodotus having described the Pythian oracle as saying: 19 “To make trial of the God is the same as to do,” 20 Aristophanes said: “For to think and to do are equivalent”; 21 before this, Parmenides said: “thinking and being are the same.” 22 Given that the comic poet ignores the oracle’s distinction between divine and human apprehension—presumably the oracle would regard making trial of a man as simply making trial of a man—it is not difficult to see this plagiarized progression as a descent into nonsense, or at least overstatement. But the possibility of this descent is already implicit in its origin: Clement’s treatment of the fragment—especially because he offers the original after its disparate offspring—makes it unclear whether Parmenides was discussing criminal intent, describing the intellectual capacities of a god, or anticipating the Sermon on the Mount. 23 As demonstrated by what Clement—our original source for it—regards as its copies, then, Parmenides’ original statement was either ambiguous in context or, once removed from that context—as Clement too removed it—it could be interpreted in very different ways.

As for Plotinus, although he treats the fragment as having a clear and unambiguous meaning, 25 that meaning is so obviously tailored to fit the dimensions

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19 *Stromata* 6.23.1-3: Ἡροδότου τε αὖ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ Σπαρτιάτου λόγῳ φήσαντο τὴν Πυθίαν εἰπεῖν τὸ πειρηθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἵσον γενέσθαι Ἀριστοφάνη̋ ἔφη δύναται γὰρ ἴσον τῷ δρᾶν τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ πρὸ τούτου ὁ Ἐλεάτης Παρμενίδη̋ τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστί τε καὶ εἶναι.

20 HERODOTUS 6.86: ἡ δὲ Πυθίη ἔφη τὸ πειρηθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἵσον δύνασθαι. The gist of the story is that Glaucus the Spartan, simply by asking the oracle whether he should or should not commit a manifest injustice, has already committed the injustice.

21 Clement is our only source for this line (fr. 711 Kassel and Austin).


23 For Stamatellos, ἵσον is not applicable to tautology; see *Plotinus and the Presocratics*, 74-75: “even if Clement does not provide us with a philosophical exegesis of the fragment [sc. B3], we can suppose, based on the parallel quotations of Aristophanes and Herodotus and the usage of the ‘equal’ (ἴσον), that the Christian author interprets his quotation from Parmenides as denoting a connection between ‘thinking’ and ‘being’ and not a tautological one. Thus, the translation of the fragment in Clement as ‘the same thing is for thinking and for being’ seems to be the most probable and reasonable.’” This improbable attribution of what I will call “the Zeller reading” of B3 to Clement is noteworthy.

24 MATTHEW 5.28.

25 *Enneads* 5.1.8 in A. H. Armstrong (ed. and trans.). *Plotinus*, volume 5. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 41, lines 9-15: “so Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good and Soul from the Intellect [the title of 5.1 is ‘On the Three Primary Hypostases’]. And [it follows] that these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato’s own writings for evidence that these views are ancient. And Parmenides also…”
of his own thought that his use of it tends rather to confirm than overcome the sense that B3 is, as Clement’s descending progression had already suggested, either fundamentally Protean or, at the very least, unusually prone to being adapted to a variety of different ends. Albeit in opposite ways, then, our two sources for B3 point to the same place: the true implications of Parmenides’ statement are unclear. Even if it were possible for a fair-minded reader to believe that the statement of Parmenides means exactly what Plotinus requires it to have meant, a latter-day Clement would still be entitled to regard the passage from *Enneads* 5.1 as but one more instance of the plagiarism process he had begun to describe. Although its potentially Protean nature corroborates my case that B3 is the sort of statement that would particularly appeal to “two-headed mortals,” the threshold point is that Clement shows how the statement could be, and indeed was taken in very different ways—especially when the distinction between God and man is ignored or transcended—while Plotinus, although he clearly regards Parmenides’ statement as true, inadvertently proves to the rest of us just how malleable it really is.

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27 See Scott Austin. *Parthenides and the History of Dialectic: Three Essays*. Las Vegas: Parmenides, 2007, p. 24: “It is, I think, possible that, as Long has suggested [Tony Long’s paper will receive attention below], Plotinus’ interpretation of fragment 3 was correct, that, in an absolutely monistic ontology, we are identical with being—or, at least, our *nous*, thought of as a non-doXastic part of ourselves that does not change, is identical.”

28 B6.4-5.

29 Cf. Austin. *Op. cit.*., p. 83: “The role of the Parmenidean poem is simply to inform us mortals of the fact that we are already immortals.” As suggested by this reading, it is probably man’s proclivity to self-deification that leads to what I will describe below as “grandiose” claims about B3.

30 It is at least worth mentioning—since some might regard it as proving that my earlier claim that Plotinus provides no hint as to where B3 belongs was an overstatement—that he classes it specifically among the ancient δόξα, and likewise describes as a δόξα (which Plotinus naturally ascribes to Plato) the Eleatic Stranger’s jointure (αἰ̃τι τοῦτο συνῆγεν) of Being (τὸ ὄν) and νοῦ̋ at *Sophist* 249a4. See Plotinus 5.1.8, lines13-17 (Armstrong, *Plotinus*, v. 5, p. 40).

31 Plotinus’ purpose in quoting Parmenides is not only to find an ancient anticipation of his three hypostases, but to palliate the problem arising in Plato’s *Sophist* from the Eleatic Stranger’s insistence (see previous note) that τὸ παντελῶ̋ ὂν (*Sophist* 248e8-249a1) both ἔχει νοῦ̋ (Sophist 239a2 and a10, and indeed the whole drift of the Stranger’s argument between 248c4 and 249b4). Plotinus’ claim that B3 does not hold true ἐν τοῖ̋ αἰσθητοῖ̋ (line 17)—which others might regard as proving my earlier
And then there is Proclus. The important point here is that Proclus not only quotes his own version of B3 in two different forms—neither close enough to the version found in both Clement and Plotinus to have been included in the apparatus of Diels-Kranz—but also quotes B2, without, however, completing its final partial hexameter with either of his variants of B3. This is the point made by Schofield to which I referred earlier:

But if so [B3 “may fit here,” i.e., after B2] it is surprising that neither Proclus nor Simplicius quotes it at the end of [B2].

If B2.8 is really completed by B3, why would both Simplicius and Proclus have ended their quotation in the same place without it, especially surprising in the case of Proclus, who evidently thought enough of our B3 to refer to it twice? And no less important is the fact that Schofield’s conditional sentence depends on yet another:

Editors often complete the half-line [B2.8], with a fragment known only in quite different sources [here he cites Clement and Plotinus and quotes B3 in Greek before translating it as follows] (‘For the same thing is there both to be thought of and to be.’) If thus translated (but some render: ‘Thought and being are the same’), it does sound as though it may fit here ... But if so...

At least for Schofield, then, the case for joining B3 to B2—a case weakened by the failure of any ancient authority, and Proclus in particular, to do so—depends also on a translation of B3 for which, once again, there is no ancient evidence:

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34 DK, p. 231.
both Clement and Plotinus understand B3 to mean “thought and being are the same,” not “for the same thing is there both to be thought and to be.”

§3. THE CURRENT AMBIGUITY OF B3

The difference between these two translations is the contested battleground about the correct interpretation of B3. It was Eduard Zeller who first introduced the idea that “the same” functions here as subject, not predicate, and for that reason, I will use his name to indicate “the Zeller reading” of the fragment, so warmly welcomed in the English-speaking world, while the older view, compatible with an idealist interpretation, will here be called “the Diels reading.” In addition to being the interpretation already implicit in both Clement and Plotinus, the Diels reading has been enshrined in Diels-Kranz, and it has deep

37 Typical, accurate (pace Stametellos), and succinct is A. H. Coxon. The Fragments of Parmenides: A Critical Text with Introduction, the ancient testimonia, and a Commentary. Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1986, p. 179: “Clement, Plotinus and Proclus, our sole sources for this fragment, all understood it as asserting the identity of conceiving or knowing with being.” Coxon’s claim gains credibility because he too, like Stametellos, embraces the Zeller reading of the fragment (p. 180) but rightly refuses to read it back into the ancient sources.

38 An indispensable new resource for the study of Parmenides is Manfred Kraus. Parmenides. In: Dieter Bremer, Hellmut Flashar, Georg Rechenauer (eds.). Frühgriechische Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike, 1/1-2, volume 2, Basel: Schwabe, 2013, p. 441-530. The most up-to-date tabulation of these two readings in on p. 464; the bibliography (pp. 502-529) is excellent.

39 Since the footnote had its greatest impact in Britain, I will quote from the English translation, i.e., Eduard Zeller. A History of Greek Philosophy, volume 1; From the Earliest Period to the Time of Socrates, with a General Introduction, translated by S.F. Alleyne. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1881, p. 584 n. 1: “This does not mean, however, ‘Thinking and Being are the same;’ the context shows that ἐστὶν is to be read, and the translation should stand thus: ‘For the same thing can be thought and can be,’ only that which can be, can be thought.”


42 The Diels reading takes “the same” as being predicated of two infinities, i.e., that “to be” and “to think” are “the same.” Zeller’s reading takes “the same” as the subject of the phrase, thereby asserting that “the same thing” both is and is there for “thinking,” i.e., “to be thought.”

43 DK, p. 231: “denn dasselbe ist Denken und Sein.” Note the small case “d” of denn; despite receiving its separate number, B3 is punctuated to follow directly B2.
roots in Germany going back to the heyday of German Idealism.\textsuperscript{44} In addition to idealist conceptions found in historians of philosophy like Dietrich Tiedemann (1791) and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1798), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1839) would discover the key to Parmenides precisely in the identity of knowing and being.\textsuperscript{45} But it is noteworthy that even though Diels’s two predecessors Karsten and Heinrich Stein\textsuperscript{46} had included B3 in their collections, they had not considered it as separable from B2: despite his acceptance of the graft, Diels would be the first scholar to assign separate numbers to the two fragments, thereby laying the foundations for independent consideration of—and hence an ongoing interpretive battle about—the proper reading of B3 itself. And it is hardly accidental that it was pre-Diels—i.e., in response to its grafted form—that Zeller discovered and offered his revisionist reading: as Schofield has pointed out, this reading fits very well with B2.1.\textsuperscript{47} To summarize: even though it entered the collection of fragments because of its alleged connection to B2, B3 would eventually acquire an independent existence in an intellectual

\textsuperscript{44} The sentence that follows is based on Kraus, Parmenides, p. 500.

\textsuperscript{45} See Dietrich Tiedemann. \textit{Geist der spekulativen Philosophie}, volume I. Marburg: Neuen akademischen Buchhandlung, 1791, and Wilhem Gottlob Tennemann. \textit{Geschichte der Philosophie}. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1798. Friedrich Schleiermacher. \textit{Geschichte der Philosophie aus Schleiermachers handschriftlichem Nachlasse}, edited by H. Ritter. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1839, pp. 62-66, is paraphrased on Kraus, \textit{art. cit.}, p. 500: “Spinozistischen und idealistischen Hintergrund verrät auch die Interpretation Schleiermachers, der eine völlige Harmonie zwischen Seinsdenken und Doxa postuliert: Wie die reine Spekulation zum reinen Dasein, so verhalte sich die Vielfältigkeit der reinen Beobachtung zur Vielheit der Dinge; der Schlüssel hierzu liege in der Identität von Erkennen und Sein.” Cf. the passage from Mourelatos quoted above. Although one wishes it were longer, Kraus’s concluding section on “Wirkungsgeschichte” (pp. 496-501) is likewise excellent, and it appears that Parmenides should have been mentioned in Frederick C. Beiser. \textit{The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte}. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987, as creating a historical context for the \textit{Pantheismusstreit}.


\textsuperscript{47} Eduard Zeller. \textit{Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung}, 5\textsuperscript{th} edition. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1892, p. 558 n. 1. In point of fact, however, the origin of the Zeller reading is older; see Karsten. \textit{Parmenidis Eleaticaes Carminis Reliquiae}, p. 74: “Sensus [sc. of B3] universe hic est: Non ens ne cogitari quidem potest: nam quodcumque cogites, esse cogitas; si esse tollatur, tollitur etiam ipsum cogitare; ergo si cogitare statuas, esse quoque fatendum est: adeo est dicere cogitare et esse.” For proof, he then cites B8.35-6.

milieu infused with the influence of German Idealism, despite the fact that the Diels reading of B3 was considerably less consistent with B2 and B8.34-36 than Zeller’s reading of it.

Thanks to Martin Heidegger, the Diels reading of B3 has by now cut itself free from what he regarded as the false conceptions of German Idealism,49 reversing, in the process, the polarity of Berkeley’s esse est percipi.50 Properly interpreted, Diels’s translation (“Denn dasselbe ist Denken und Sein”) will become for Heidegger “das Grundthema des gesamten abendländisch-europäischen Denkens.”51 Although apparently not the principal subject of either the lectures entitled “Was heißt Denken” (1951-52) or “Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34–41)” (1952), it in fact dominates both,52 pointing the way toward the proper sense, respectively, of both B8.34 and B6.1, and becoming thereby the center of Heidegger’s post-War reception of Parmenides.53 And given that Heidegger said of Sophist 248ε7–249α2 in 1924 that “the passage is the center and is decisive for understanding the whole ontological discussion,”54 B3 was arguably the basis for Heidegger’s reopening

49 Martin Heidegger. Einführung in die Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983 (Gesamtausgabe, 40), p. 145: “Man versteht νοεῖν als Denken, das Denken als Tätigkeit des Subjekts. Das Denken des Subjekts bestimmt, was Sein ist. Sein ist nichts anderes als das Gedachte des Denkens. Da nun das Denken eine subjektive Tätigkeit bleibt, Denken und Sein nach Parmenides dasselbe sein sollen, wird alles subjektiv. Es gibt kein an sich Seiendes. Eine solche Lehre aber, so erzählt man, finde sich bei Kant und im Deutschen Idealismus.”


51 Martin Heidegger. Was heißt Denken? Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002, p. 244; note Heidegger’s use of capital “D” in Denk (so also Gesamtausgabe, 7, p. 237); cf. n. 43 above.

52 Heidegger. Gesamtausgabe, 8, p. 246.

53 Cf. the opening paragraph of Moira (Gesamtausgabe, 7, p. 237) with the final lecture of Was heißt Denken? (Gesamtausgabe, 8, pp. 231-247).

54 The book that became Einführung in der Metaphysik (1955) was originally delivered as lectures in 1935. Heidegger was lecturing on Parmenides at the time of Stalingrad (1942-43) but these lectures do not consider B3.

of the *Seinsfrage* in the temporalized context of *Dasein in Sein und Zeit* (1927),\textsuperscript{56} although there is no evidence that he realized that this passage in Plato was vital to the fragment’s transmission through both Plotinus and Proclus.\textsuperscript{57}

As suggested by the opening words of A. A. Long’s robust defense of the Diels reading of B3 (1996),\textsuperscript{58} it is, at least for the most part,\textsuperscript{59} Heidegger’s influence that has—in addition to the syntactical problems of its rival—kept that reading alive in the English-speaking world, and a competent intellectual historian could probably trace the most sweeping claims made about B3’s centrality since the mid-twentieth century to Heidegger’s influence.\textsuperscript{60} In any case, grandiose claims about the importance of B3 are inseparable from the Diels reading of it. And grandiose claims about B3 are not difficult to find: in the wake of A. A. Long, the work of Chiara Robbiano is the paradigmatic example.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{56} Heidegger. Plato’s *Sophist*, p. 334: “Plato has been understood to be saying here that the genuine beings, the Ideas, would have understanding, life, and the like. This is sheer nonsense. What the passage says is that φρόνησις, νοῦς, and ζωή keep company with the genuine beings; in other words, the meaning of Being must be conceived in such a way that νοῦς, κίνησις, and ζωή can also be understood as beings.” In the original—Martin Heidegger. *Platon, Sophistes*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992 (Gesamtausgabe, 19), p. 482 — an attached note reads: “Zum Sein gehört Seinsverständnis.”

\textsuperscript{57} See n. 31 above and n. 159 below.

\textsuperscript{58} Long. *Parmenides on Thinking Being*, p. 125: “At the end of one of his studies of Parmenides [sc. Moira] Heidegger wrote: ....”

\textsuperscript{59} Heidegger is not mentioned in David Sedley. *Parmenides and Melissus*. In: A. A. Long (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 113-133, but see notes 9-10 on p. 132, both pointing back to Sedley’s embrace of the Diels reading on p. 120. Note his “of uncertain location” and “natural” on p. 120, and “tortuous syntax” on p. 132 n. 9.


\textsuperscript{61} Chiara Robbiano. *Becoming Being: On Parmenides’ Transformative Philosophy*. Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2006, p. 129: “Parmenides is a monist: noein is the same as einai if and when one manages to focus with one’s nous on Being, to understand it and to become one with it.” Cf. A. A. Long. Presocratic Philosophy. *Phronesis*, v. 53, n. 3, 2008, p. 290-302, on pp. 296-97: “Rather than taking Parmenides’ project to be an analysis of reality that detaches the knower from the knowable, what primarily interests Robbiano is ‘the place of the knowing subject in a monistic reality’...Only the most rigidly analytical readers will leave this book without having their understanding of Parmenides enhanced” [note 11, attached at this point, also deserves attention].
while José Trindade Santos, Martin Henn, and Vishwa Adluri also deserve mention. Meanwhile, a particularly good example of a Heideggerian reading of Parmenides that locates the Diels reading of B3 at the dead center of its concerns is Vigdis Songe-Möller’s Zwiefältige Wahrheit und zeitliches Sein: Eine Interpretation des parmenideischen Gedichts (1980).

On the other hand, Zeller’s revisionist interpretation of B3 was warmly embraced in Britain. Endorsed by John Burnet, it was defended by F. M. Cornford, and ultimately took its place in W. K. C. Guthrie’s History of Greek Philosophy. Despite eminent holdouts like Long, Charles H. Kahn, and Gregory Vlastos, influential Anglophone scholars like Leonardo Táran, Patricia Curd, 


69 Charles H. Kahn. The Thesis of Parmenides. Review of Metaphysics, v. 22, n. 4, 1969, p. 700-724 on p. 721: “It would be tedious to defend this obvious rendering of the lines [sc. ‘For knowing and being are the same’ and B8.34] against other more recherché interpretations which have enjoyed greater favor in the modern literature on Parmenides.”


and Richard McKirahan\textsuperscript{73} (along with many others)\textsuperscript{74} have embraced it. In the midst of an ongoing debate, it is perfectly understandable that its proponents now seldom admit, as Táran did, that the Diels reading is “most natural.”\textsuperscript{75} But the fact remains that it is.

Although it did not receive much critical notice in Anglophone circles, Jürgen Wiesner’s\textit{ Parmenides: Der Beginn der Aletheia} (1996) subjected Zeller’s reading to a thorough and devastating philological examination made all the more powerful by its calm and balanced approach.\textsuperscript{76} Even if Panagiotis Thanassas—who nevertheless accords its author the high praise he is due—\textsuperscript{77} is correct about the Heideggerian echoes in Wiesner’s book,\textsuperscript{78} the analysis Wiesner offers of the various problems implicit in reading νοεῖν as passive,\textsuperscript{79} in moving from a passive to an implicitly active infinitive,\textsuperscript{80} and above all in taking “the same” as B3’s subject—\textsuperscript{81} despite other passages in the fragments where it is used as a predicate\textsuperscript{82}—makes

\textsuperscript{73} Richard McKirahan. \textit{Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary}, second edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2010, pp. 146 and 172: “there is no suggestion that what-is thinks or is identical with thought.” As the previous discussion of Plotinus indicates (see n. 29 above), at least the first half of this claim ignores \textit{Spb.} 248e7-249a10, the immediate context for the introduction of B3 in \textit{Enneads} 5.1.8.

\textsuperscript{74} See Kraus, art. cit., p. 464.

\textsuperscript{75} As does Táran, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 41: “the most natural interpretation of the fragment is the one based on its literal translation: ‘For to think and to be is one and the same thing.'” Naturally this is heard frequently on the other side: in addition to Sedley, Parmenides and Melissus, p. 120, see E. D. Phillips. Parmenides on Thought and Being. \textit{Philosophical Review}, v. 64, n. 4, 1955, p. 546-560, on p. 549 (“the natural sense”), and T. M. Robinson Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real. \textit{Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, v. 4, n. 4, 1975, p. 623-633 on p. 626 (“the natural interpretation”). But Robinson underestimated—“with the exception of KR, practically every student of Parmenides concedes” (p. 626)—the appeal of the Zeller reading even before 1975, failing to mention (in addition to Burnet and Cornford) both Táran and Uvo Hölscher.


\textsuperscript{77} Thanassas, \textit{op. cit.}, refers to “Wiesner’s balanced and philologically balanced analysis” on p. 38 n. 24.

\textsuperscript{78} Panagiotis Thanassas. Parmenidean Dualisms. \textit{In:} Cordero, N.-L. (ed.). \textit{op. cit.}, p. 289-305 on p. 299: “The suggestion of the philologist Wiesner that we understand the identity of fr. 3 as an ‘equivalence of concepts related to each other’ coincides here with Heidegger’s understanding of the ‘sameness’ as a ‘belonging together’ of Being and Thinking.” The attached note references \textit{Was heißt Denken?}

\textsuperscript{79} Wiesner. \textit{Op. cit.}, pp. 142-143. He deals with the infinitives as datives on pp. 141-142.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 144-145.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 148, concluding with: “B3 fiele also, wenn τὸ αὐτό hier als Subjekt betrachtet würde, hinsichtlich des sonstigen Gebrauchs völlig aus dem Rahmen.”

\textsuperscript{82} B6.8, B8.29, and B8.57.
for a compelling case, not least of all because he is scarcely laboring in the service of any grandiose reading of B3, and indeed upholds its traditional place as the continuation of B2.\(^{83}\) If there is an Achilles heel in Wiesner's analysis—and I believe that there is one—it is not his decision for the Diels reading of B3, but rather in his possibly one-sided,\(^{84}\) and in any case anachronistic use of Gorgias to demonstrate the fragment's place at the beginning of "Truth."\(^{85}\)

My response to this critical impasse is to embrace the more natural Diels reading while simultaneously offering the suggestion that B3 does not deserve its current place among the fragments of "Truth." I consider the Zeller reading to be an understandable response to the 'misplacement' of B3: beginning with Zeller himself, responsible scholars, intent on making the "Truth" of Parmenides at least plausibly true, have attempted to defend a reading of B3 that makes it consistent with the other fragments of "Truth." While the Zeller reading interprets B3 in the light of B6.1 and B8.34-36,\(^{86}\) Heidegger's use of the Diels reading does the opposite. In short: I take the most grandiose claims about B3 based on the Diels reading as tending toward a *reductio ad absurdum* on the uncritical presumption that the fragment belongs to "Truth," while explaining the Zeller reading as a grammatically unnatural phantom, inevitably arising from the far more serious error of not locating B3 in "Doxa." Once having been detached not only from B2 but also from "Truth," even the most the grandiose claims about B3 can be safely upheld while leaving some sober version of "Truth"—i.e., one that both upholds the disjunction of "Truth" from "Doxa," and which (therefore) does not depend on the Diels reading of B3—in possession of the most significant battlefield. To put it another way: if the upholders of the Zeller reading of B3 are willing to surrender that reading in return for moving B3 to "Doxa," they can win the war by losing a battle. Meanwhile, a new fight over the proper placement of


\(^{84}\) There is at least something to be said for the view that Gorgias' project as a whole depends on the truth of B3; see Charles P. Segal. *Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos*. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, v. 66, 1962, p. 99-155, on pp. 106-107 and p. 110.


B3 will redraw the interpretive battle-lines in relation to the fundamental differences between “Doxa” and “Truth,” a territory far more congenial to discerning Parmenides’ own intentions.

§4. The Intrinsic Ambiguity of B3

Before offering some tentative suggestions about what a Diels reading of B3 might mean once it has been removed to “the Way of Opinion,” the crucial point for my argument is that none of ancient sources offer us any clear indication that B3 belongs in “Truth,” and it is even unclear whether they were alive to the distinction between the poem’s two different parts.87 Clement clearly recognized that B3 could be productive of mutually exclusive variations, and its potentially Protean nature would inevitably increase its appeal to βροτοὶ δίκρανοι, just as its interpretive motility and mutability scarcely suggests what the Goddess had called Αληθείη εὐκυκλέο ἀτρεμὲ ἦτορ.88 The same point applies to the Diels and Zeller readings of B3: its unquestionable capacity to create controversy—to turn a hundred a fifty years worth of competent scholars into those Diels justly called Doppelköpfe—may well be intrinsic to the fragment itself.89 The suggestion that B3 should be moved to “Doxa” is then, first and foremost, intended to call attention to the lack of evidence for the fragment’s current placement. In this context, the purpose of the remainder of this paper is not to prove where, or even that, the fragment belongs in “Doxa,” but simply to show how and why it could just as reasonably belong there. Before using the conclusions of Mourelatos to indicate what I take inclusion in “Doxa” to mean (§5), this section will draw attention to the features of B3 that make it intrinsically and deliberately ambiguous.

But before indicating these features, it is necessary to address two prior matters: (a) the complex relationship between the fragment’s intrinsic ambiguity and its proven capacity to generate controversy, and (b) the pervasive ambiguity intrinsic to the entire poem. With respect to (a), the presumption here is that the controversy between the Diels and Zeller readings described in section

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87 As Aristotle famously was not: see Metaphysics 986b27-987a2 (Ross).
88 B1.29 and B6.4-5.
89 DK, 233.
90 Consider F. E. Sparshott. Looking for Philosophy. Montreal: Queens University Press, 1972, p. 110: “Parmenides long ago said ‘To be, and to be thought about are one and the same.’ Or did he say ‘Only what can think can exist?’ Or even ‘Thinking and Being are the same?’ A certain crankiness in his venerable syntax, perhaps even in his venerable character, prevents us from ever being quite sure.” By contrast, my proposal would only exempt his character from crankiness, not the syntax of B3.
§3 is, on the one hand, ‘extrinsic’ to the fragment itself, and therefore it is only the intrinsic ambiguity of the fragment in its more natural form—enshrined in Diels-Kranz—that will hereafter be in play. But there is also a sense in which that controversy arises from the unpalatable consequences of the more natural reading: it was his dissatisfaction with it that led Zeller to his reading. Even after the bracketing of this extrinsic interpretive controversy, then, the battle over the correct translation of B3 should be recognized as a consequence of the fragment’s intrinsic ambiguity. In short: a decision for the Diels reading may settle the syntactic question but does not resolve the question of the fragment’s true meaning. And the proposal that it belongs in “Doxa” honors the fact that none will be forthcoming: it would be the height of folly to insist that B3 could acquire a univocal meaning once moved into the realm of βροτῶν δόξαι, in which, by definition, οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστι̋ ἀληθ̋ (B1.30). Although a distinction might be made between the fragment’s intrinsic ambiguity and the possibility that it unambiguously articulates a misguided view, I will show instead how both of these could be simultaneously in play.

The issues surrounding (b) surface in an original and thought-provoking article by James Barrett, the center of which is that there is more ambiguity in “Truth” than there is in “Doxa.” Barrett expresses his respect for Mourelatos in many places, but I cannot think his argument honors the account of “Doxa” that appears in chapter 9 of The Route of Parmenides, and to which I ascribe (see section §5). Barrett’s claim that “Doxa” can only be recognized as ambiguous once it has been “seen through” is both insightful and true, but “the stunning syntactic challenges” of the first part arise from the inherent difficulty of making it possible to see or hear ‘beyond’ what is said in the “Truth.” To put it another way: what makes B8.34-36 difficult to understand is that it points to

91 The point I want to make can perhaps best be expressed in metaphorical terms: B3 should be recognized as an unbroken colt: Zeller’s reading of it should be seen as an attempt to “tame” or even “break” the colt, while the Diels reading wants to make it the lead horse in the Goddess’s chariot. My proposal is to let it “run free” or even “wild,” but only on the plane of “Doxa.”


93 Barrett, art. cit., p. 286 n. 51 and p. 287 n. 53: “Although the ‘Doxa’ is not without ambiguities, it contains none of the stunning syntactic challenges of the ‘Aletheia.’ Mourelatos, op. cit., pp. 222-263 has, of course, made a compelling case for ambiguity and irony in the poem’s second part, but in recognizing these elements one has already transcended the seductive, familiar ‘naming’ therein.”
It is certainly the case that any claim that B3 is intrinsically ambiguous can be met with an argument considerably less sophisticated than Barrett’s: there are many ambiguous statements in the poem, and there are even more of them among the fragments of “Truth.” First of all, we have more of “Truth,” so this proves very little. More importantly, the Goddess tells us in “Truth” that “Doxa” will be deceptive. It is true that “two-headed mortals” will encounter great difficulty in determining what the Goddess means by Being; she is revealing an entirely new conception both of it and of thinking. But even though all of us know what both Fire and Night are, we learn very little about what those words actually ‘name’ in the “Doxa.”

It is not the inherent difficulty of finding a way to reveal the heretofore unknown that infects B3: indeed the fragment, especially when considered as the premise it is, encourages us to believe that we already know more about Being than we thought we did.

What makes B3 intrinsically ambiguous is that it asserts the identity of two things, neither of which has a univocal meaning in the poem as a whole. First of all, there are identity statements in both of its parts, and indeed the closest parallel to τὸ γὰρ αὐτό in B3 is in B16.2, i.e., in “Doxa.” Moreover, the use of γάρ in B16 indicates that we are dealing in both cases with the premise of an argument. B16 also contains references to νοῦς (B16.2) and νόημα (B16.4), the latter explicitly linked to νοεῖν in “Truth” (B8.34). Without the Zeller reading of B3, the identity or even compatibility of B3 with B8.34-36 tends to disappear, and on the Diels reading, there is no good reason to think that “to think” necessarily means the same thing in these two passages. If we can doubt that the verb νοεῖν in B8.36 applies to the νοῦς of B16.2 or B6.6, we are surely entitled to confusion when we encounter it in the premise of a missing argument at B3. Moreover, the use of νοῦς in B6.6, closely following the νοεῖν of B6.1, must surely prepare us to recognize how ambiguous “to think” can be. And of course the meaning of εἶναι is, if anything, even more contested in the poem.

When ἔστιν appears in B16.3, it certainly doesn’t mean the same thing that it does in B2.3, and there is no solid reason to think that the εἶναι of B3 is any closer in meaning to the way the word is used at B2.3 than in B1.32. So here, then, is the basis for what

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95 See Barrett. *Art. cit.*, p. 283: “In naming, that is, mortals ‘produce’ their world by means of and in language.” This observation is well taken but Barrett never singles out the names “Light” and “Night” for attention.
I call “the intrinsic ambiguity of B3” once the syntactic ambiguity arising from the controversy about the Zeller or Diels reading of it has been bracketed: even with the unambiguous syntax of the more natural Zeller reading, it states as a premise the identity of two verbs, neither of which is even identical to itself.\(^{97}\) On a “doxastic reading” of B3, then, it both unambiguously states a misguided view and misguidedly states an ambiguous view.

§5. MOURELATOS AND “DOXA”

It is now necessary to take a stand on the general significance of “Doxa” into which I propose the fragment should be moved.\(^{98}\) To that end, it is the last chapter in Mourelatos’s book to which I will point.\(^{99}\) First of all, Mourelatos plays throughout the chapter on the punning contrast (“mixing vs. sharp disjunction”)\(^{100}\) between κράσις and κρίσις.\(^{101}\) The latter word becomes a crucial example of what he calls, following Hesiod, \(^{102}\) ἀμφιλογία or “double-talk.”\(^{103}\) Building on the etymology of δικρανοί,\(^{104}\) he creates a series of two-columned tables that culminate in the ἀμφιλογία at the still heart of separation itself:

In row (i) we find that mortals practice a κρίσις, “separation,” and a placing χωρίς, “apart.” But unlike the radical κρίσις between “is” and “is not” of “Truth,” which is a logical κρίσις, what we get here is a physical separation: not λόγῳ but δέμας.\(^{105}\)

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\(^{97}\) I need to express my gratitude at this point to Oliver Primavesi, whose trenchant questions when I presented an earlier version of this paper, forced me to grasp—as I had not done before—the essence of what it was that makes B3 intrinsically ambiguous.


\(^{101}\) Ibid., beginning on p. 226.

\(^{102}\) Hesiod. Theogony, v. 229.


\(^{104}\) Ibid., p. 229 and p. 229 n. 23.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., p. 249.
Second in importance only to the ontological κρίσις between “is” and “is not,” is the pedagogical κρίσις that Parmenides creates between “Truth” and “Doxa,” and at the end of “Deceptive Words,” Mourelatos uses B16—which underscores the role of κρίσις in “Doxa”—to make some final points about the poem’s two parts. Without denying “an uncanny similarity” between B16 “and such lines as B3, B4, and B8.34ff.,” Mourelatos comments on the fact that “a number of scholars have stressed the affinity of B16 with statements concerning the relation of mind to reality” as follows:

The similarities can seduce us into treating the epistemology and metaphysics of “Doxa” as the next best thing to the epistemology and metaphysics of “Truth”—against Parmenides’ express warnings to the contrary.

Although Mourelatos rejects “the extreme thesis that B16 actually belongs to the first part,” he likewise cautions against ignoring the reality of a seduction that necessarily depends on “an ambiguity intrinsic to the text.” It is these words that perfectly describe the ἀμφιλογία intrinsic to B3 once it has taken its proper place in “Doxa,” and thereby recognized as a deliberately ambiguous and deceptive

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109 Ibid., p. 256.

110 Ibid., p. 256-257.

111 Ibid., p. 257 and p. 257 n. 92.

112 Ibid., p. 257: “B16 does three things: Openly and directly it gives a physiology of thought; indirectly it censures human thought as ‘wandering’ and ‘confusion’; but it also gives subtle reminders [cf. 256: ‘If the second sentence had been preserved in isolation, we would feel justified to place it in the context of ‘Truth.’"] of the proper relationship between mind and reality.”
As revealed by the Goddess, “Truth” forces us to confront our human limitations, and makes us wonder whether we have ever really had what she calls a νόημα or are even capable of νοεῖν. While resembling B8.34-36 in accordance with Mourelatos’s schema, the doxastic reading of B3 raises the twinned possibility, neither true but both flattering, that every existent thing thinks (section §6) and that Being thinks as we do (section §7). If both of these possibilities are false, it is possible for B3 to state unambiguously a misguided view while simultaneously misguidedly stating an ambiguous view.

§6. THEOPHRASTUS AND B3

The proposed removal of B3 from “Truth” to “Doxa” fortunately has ample precedent: in addition to the fact that some have called for removing B3 from the collection entirely, parallel or complementary proposals have already been made to move B16 from “Doxa” to “Truth,” and to move B4 from “Truth” to “Doxa.” In fact, Nestór-Luis Cordero has argued repeatedly for a full-scale migration of fragments from “Doxa” to “Truth”, the time is therefore ripe to consider a proposal that might once have seemed—no matter how unreasonably, given the lack of evidence in our ancient sources—unthinkable. But it is worth making explicit the fact that although it will encounter strong opposition from both defenders of the Zeller and Diels readings in their traditional forms, the proposed move will be most vigorously opposed by those who seek to blur the dividing line between the poem’s two parts. The proposed removal of B3 must inevitably sharpen the line of demarcation between “Truth” and “Doxa,” and

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116 In addition to Cordero, By Being, It Is, op. cit., see his Parmenidean ‘Physics’ is not Part of what Parmenides calls ‘δόξα’. In: Cordero, N.-L. (ed.). Parmenides, venerable and awesome, op. cit., p. 95-113.

117 See the review of Cordero, Parmenides at Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2012.09.44. URL: http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2012/2012-09-44.html.
indeed it is my hope that a debate about moving it would *ipso facto* contribute to a better understanding of that line, compelling all involved to reconsider the kind of deception that makes “Doxa” what the Goddess called it: “a deceptive cosmos of words.” Moreover, if B3 belongs in “Doxa,” it stands to reason that those who make the Diels reading of it central to the correct interpretation of “Truth” would tend to blur the distinction between “Truth” and “Doxa.” Plausible on logical grounds, there is already—as indicated in the notes—some empirical evidence indicating this link between B3-based interpretations and a softening of the division between the poem’s two parts; if this linkage were proved true on an empirical basis, or even simply acknowledged on a logical one, that would provide an indirect argument for moving B3.

Our only evidence for what may have been B3’s the specific place in “Doxa” is what Diels-Kranz identifies as A46: the passage from the *De Sensibus* of Theophrastus that contains B16. The key sentence in this passage reads: καὶ ὁλω̋ δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὲν ἐξαν τινὰ γνῶσιν. In discussing Parmenides’ views of perception, Theophrastus offers a very simple paraphrase of what is called “the mind-being identity” that not only has deep roots in pre-Parmenidean thought, but is soon enough going to be specifically embraced by Empedocles: all that exists has some kind of apprehension that Theophrastus here calls γνῶσις. The notion that the truly existent stuff of Presocratic physics is fundamentally alive is a well-documented commonplace. And Theophrastus offers a plausible bridge between whatever kind of life this was, and his sweeping and perhaps problematic claim (hence the initial ὁλω̋) that πᾶν τὸ ὲν ἐξαν τινὰ γνῶσιν, immediately after quoting B16: τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ῥα ταὐτὸ λέγει. If Parmenides actually “says” what Theophrastus claims that he wrote, then there was at least one more statement in the environs of B16 that resembled B3: an identity claim resting on a predicative use of ταὐτό or τὸ γὰρ αἰτό. I would suggest that Theophrastus’ use

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118 B8.52.
119 Perhaps the most thoughtful expression of this trend is Panagiotis Thanassas. Parmenidean Dualisms. *In: Parmenides, venerable and awesome*, p. 289-308, where the differences between “Truth” and “Doxa,” as those between Thought and Being, are subjected to a Hegelian *Aufhebung*.
121 DK A46.15-16.
123 DK 31 (Empedocles) B110.10.
of λέγει arose from the fact that Parmenides had not actually ‘written’ but merely ‘implied’ that perception (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι) and τὸ φρονεῖν are, as it were (ὡς), the same (τὰ ὅτι), and indeed had already done so in B16. Having first paraphrased his own understanding of what Parmenides is saying in B16, Theophrastus will go on to make a larger assertion: Parmenides believed that everything that is has some kind of γνῶσις. Given the fact that Theophrastus uses both the substantive infinitive τὸ φρονεῖν and the noun γνῶσις as synonyms—both connected to “what is” by the middle term τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι—it is therefore plausible that it was in the context of B16 that Parmenides linked τὸ φρονεῖν with πᾶν τὸ ὄν by means of the famous words τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι.125

I have already alluded to the fact that several scholars have called for moving B16 into “Truth.” Not surprisingly, their arguments not only depend on the related—and naturally unquestioned—presupposition that B3 belongs in “Truth,” but also that B3 is importantly constitutive of what Parmenides regards as true.126 In this light, such arguments should not be considered merely as the precedent (by analogy) for my proposed removal of B3 to “Doxa,” but rather as its ‘complementary antithesis’: both calls for removal acknowledge the kinship of B16 and B3, but they differ on a matter that can be considered in isolation from the interpretation of B3: the veridical status—for Parmenides, that is—of B16.127

I suggest that all calls for moving B16 into “Truth” should be regarded as a very specific kind of indirect argument for making the opposite move, inadvertently supporting a direct argument for moving B3 into the vicinity of B16 on the basis of A46. Pending the appearance of more such attempts—attempts that will predictably aim at reconciling “Doxa” with “Truth”—an important 1990 article by

125 Cf. Loenen. Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias, op. cit., p. 58: “His [sc. Theophrastus’] mistake becomes fully intelligible if fr. 16 really succeeded our fr. 3. Indeed he may quite easily have taken the words τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι to mean: knowledge depends on the concrete being (the constitution) of the human individual, if fr. 16 followed immediately (it is introduced with γάρ and he read ἑκάστοτε). He could thus arrive at a consistent, though quite mistaken interpretation. He then regarded the κράσι μελέων as a further explanation of the εἶναι in fr. 3.”

126 In addition to Loenen, op. cit., pp. 58-59 (quoted above), see Hershbell. Parmenides’ Way of Truth and B16, pp. 1, 6, and 14: “But if B16 belonged to the Way of Truth, where was its original place in the poem? Loenen, who also believes that B16 is a fragment of the Way of Truth, places it after B3. This seems to be correct, especially in view of Theophrastus’ remark ‘absolutely everything that is, has a certain kind of understanding.’ Moreover, both fragments contain the expression τὸ ἑνὶ, and that this is a reference to that which is or τὸ ἐόν is strongly suggested by B8.29.”

127 The authoritative entry of neuroscience into the mind-body debate indicates that Parmenides, not least of all in B16, was well aware of the general tendency of βροτῶν γνώμη (B8.61), suggested by B8.1 in B16, was ahead of his time in anticipating the tendency of current opinion.
André Laks provides another kind of indirect evidence.\(^{128}\) In addition to a careful consideration of A46,\(^{129}\) including a perceptive remark, in a footnote, about the crucial phrase καὶ ὅλω̋ δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν,\(^{130}\) Laks draws attention to the 1958 dissertation of Karl Deichgräber, who made this important observation:

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\text{Die vier Versen des zweiten Teils [sc. B16] waren die Übersetzung des Denkens = Seinsgedankens in die Krasiswelt der ins Prinzipielle erhobenen Anschauung der Menschen.}^{131}
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Not only is this sentence a clear statement of the B3/B16 link, it also contains an important neologism: Deichgräber's Krasiswelt is both a perfect description of the cosmos as described in Parmenides' 'Doxa,' and a wonderful hint about the later dialogues of Plato.\(^{132}\) More accessibly, the word "Krasiswelt" anticipates one of the most important passages in Mourelatos's magisterial Route (see section §5).

A principal advantage of moving B3 is that we are no longer under any obligation to provide an interpretation of it that Parmenides himself could have plausibly regarded as true: it need only be the kind of statement he could have regarded as sufficiently likely (B8.60) that it would seem to be so (B1.31-2) to βροτοὶ δίκρανοι (B6.4-5). Placed in the context of B16 on the basis of Theophrastus' testimony in A46, the interpretation of B3 I have just presented fulfills these conditions, locating its meaning somewhere between Empedocles and Descartes.\(^{133}\) No matter how foreign to ancient thought may be the paradigmatically modern claim


\(^{129}\) Laks, art. cit., beginning on 4.

\(^{130}\) Laks, art. cit., p.12 n. 35: “The lability [Most’s translation deserves praise] of human thoughts is thus anchored in the relative identity of the two elements [sc. the elements of ‘Doxa’ as described in B9]. Besides, the logic of Parmenides’ position would seem to entail that thought should not be the prerogative of men. The end of Theophrastus’ summary confirms this: καὶ ὅλω̋ δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν. This is also Empedocles’ thesis with regard to the four elements [citation deleted]. But it seems difficult to find this idea within fr. 16 itself.” Hence the need for B3.


\(^{133}\) Cf. Owen, Eleatic Questions, art. cit., pp. 84-102, on 95: “The comparison [sc. with ‘what is declared to exist in B2 is simply what can be talked or thought about’] with Descartes’ cogito is inescapable: both arguments cut free of inherited premises, both start from an assumption whose denial is peculiarly self-refuting.”
Descartes presented as self-evident, the family resemblance between “everything that thinks is” and “everything that is thinks” is strong enough—especially since there is nothing intrinsically asymmetrical about the Greek words τὸ αὐτὸ—that no modern is in a good position to deny that Parmenides could have regarded such a claim as at least plausible. And even when we preclude the Cartesian reading of a doxastic B3 by reading the statement as intentionally asymmetrical, the fact that our thoughts immediately fly to the fundamentally implausible claim that inanimate objects like rocks can perceive, think, or “have some kind of knowledge,” should force us to wonder why the most obvious and natural test cases for the Diels reading of B3 are nowhere near the realm of “Truth.” For reasons already mentioned, however, B3 could also mean something even more truth-like, for example: that which completely is (τὸ παντελῶ ὄν) also thinks, and does so in a manner that transcends mere perception.

And this observation marks the boundary between Theophrastus and Plato, the subject of this paper’s last section. There is, moreover, good reason for placing Plato last: although it is only Theophrastus who offers any evidence as to ‘where’ B3 may have been found in “Doxa,” he is not the most reliable source in all respects. Laks—whose fore-mentioned article is an attempt to gain increased sympathy for the theory of perception described in B16—admits that at least one of Theophrastus’ claims has no precedent in Parmenides, and those claims seem

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134 Cf. Phillips. Parmenides on Thought and Being, art. cit., pp. 556-57: “If thinking and being are the same, then first, everything that thinks is, which is trivial; but secondly, everything that is thinks, which is not trivial, at any rate. The general proposition ‘Everything that thinks is’ is implied in Descartes’ singular one ‘I think, therefore I am,’ and is the logical ground of its cogency once ‘I think’ is taken as intuitively certain. But that is the extent of Parmenides’ agreement with Descartes in his line of argument, for he does not base a world on this certainty, as Descartes attempts to do. But the two are alike in the a priori character of their thought. The proposition ‘everything, that is, thinks’ would mean at least that everything is in some sense alive, which seems to be believed in some form or other by most pre-Socratics.”

135 Cf. Kahn, art. cit., pp. 723-724: “It is worth noting, however, that both in Parmenides and in Aristotle the identity is characterized by a curious asymmetry: it is always νοῦ or νοεῖν which is identified with—or reduced to—its object, never conversely. Parmenides never says that Being is thinking (or being-thought); Aristotle does not say that the intelligible objects are themselves intelligent (except in the special case of the First Mover, where the identity does seem to be symmetrical.” Leaving Aristotle aside, there are texts in Plato’s Sophist and Parmenides (the latter to be considered, the former to be reconsidered in section §7 below) that apply indirectly to Kahn’s italicized claims.

136 Cf. Sph. 248c7-249a4.


138 See Laks, art. cit., p. 5.
suspiciously Aristotelian throughout. What makes this a serious matter is that since Theophrastus follows his teacher in misconstruing Night and Light as hot and cold, he may also have followed him in attributing to Parmenides the view that φρόνησις is sensation. It is therefore only in tandem with the Platonic texts implicated by the transmission of B3 by Plotinus and Proclus that the evidence of Theophrastus should be considered.

§7. PLATO AND B3

In a brief 1967 note, Tarán found an echo of B8.34 not in B3 itself but in what had up to then been considered—when it was considered at all—to be one of Proclus’s two “inaccurate” versions of B3: ταύτων δ’ ἔστιν ἔκει νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι. Tarán’s suggestive claim that “Proclus in Parm. 1152.33 is more likely to be a paraphrase of B8.34 than B3” can now be strengthened. The same veneration for B3 that has kept it in “Truth,” preserved in its true form only by Clement and Plotinus, has relegated Proclus’ quotations to the lowly status of inaccurate versions “contaminated” by B8.34-36. Were this veneration to be dispelled by moving B3 to “Doxa,” however, we could consider the possibility that the quotation in Proclus is another legitimate fragment of Parmenides. It would be much like B3: both would echo B8.34-36, and both would be denizens of “Doxa.” There can be no objection to its inclusion on the grounds of redundancy: even after B3 has been removed, there still remains B6.1 and B8.34-36 as an example of a similar doublet in “Truth.” There is also the curious circumstance that Proclus preserves two different versions of it: in addition to the theory of his faulty

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139 I am grateful to the very thoughtful comments of one of this article’s anonymous readers for emphasizing this important point, and for many other useful criticisms and suggestions as well.
140 Metaphysics 986b27-987a2.
141 Metaphysics 1009b12-25.
143 It is not mentioned in DK (see earlier note).
146 See Guérard, art. cit., p. 305.
147 The existence and implications of doublets that span “Truth” and “Doxa” are the principal theme of chapter Deceptive Words in Mourelatos, Route of Parmenides, op. cit.
memory, there is also the possibility that there were actually two, and that one of them contained the word ἐκεῖ. The use of this word suggests contrast, either with “Truth” or with a prior iteration of B3 in “Doxa.” Regardless of priority, the advantage of considering the possibility of a second iteration of “the mind-being identity” in “Doxa” is that it would conveniently explain how two very different meanings emerged from it, i.e., the meaning that arose from Theophrastus in section §6, and the one to be considered here. As cited by Proclus—and this, of course, resembles its use in Plotinus in Enneads 5.1.8—the fragment bears on the Eleatic Stranger’s claim in Plato’s Sophist that what completely is (τὸ παντελῶ ὁν) is not only changed by being thought, but that it itself thinks. In a brilliant article entitled Toward a Radical Interpretation of Parmenides B3, Donna M. Giancola argues that the fragment should be understood in just this sense. When compared with the meaning I have proposed for B3 in the context of B16/A46, we would then be dealing with a double example of ἀμφιλογία that introduces ambiguity into both νοεῖν and εἶναι, depending on which side of the Stranger’s γιγαντομαχία we are considering: in the merely mundane world of physical objects, all that is has a form of γνῶσις that may well be nothing more elevated than a hylozoic capacity for perception, while in some other place marked as ἐκεῖ—presumably in the divine realm Parmenides

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149 See n. 31 above.
150 Spb. 248c-i-e6, on which see G. E. L. Owen, Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present, reprinted in Martha Craven Nussbaum (ed.). Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. London: Duckworth and Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 27-44, on pp. 42-44, ending with: “for all the objectors can show to the contrary, the argument (B) [sc. Spb. 248e7-249b3] can be, as a first reading of the text would suggest, simply a reinforcing argument to (A) [sc. Spb. 248c-i-e6]. It is designed to cut away the chief reasons for rejecting the conclusions of (A), namely the wish to cling to the first criterion and represent reality as unchanging. The second point is more important for our purpose. It is that Plato will have recognized an important qualification to the claim that any statement about justice or a prime number is a tenseless statement, and recognized this as a corollary of his theory.” See the following note for a surprisingly similar conclusion, likewise attributed to Plato, regarding temporalized Being.
151 Spb. 248e7-249a10.
152 Giancola, art. cit., p. 636: “for Parmenides Being is intelligent.”
153 Spb. 246a4.

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treated in his theogony\textsuperscript{155}—that which really is, also thinks.\textsuperscript{156} It is of course also possible that Parmenides managed to invest a single iteration of B3 with sufficient contextual ambiguity to give rise to the very different ways that emerge, respectively, from the evidence of Theophrastus and that of Proclus and Plotinus.

Apart from being the basis for the double-iteration hypothesis, Proclus’ testimony more importantly draws increased attention to Plato, where disparate echoes of B3 can be heard in \textit{Sophist}, \textit{Parmenides}, and \textit{Laws}. In his \textit{Platonic Theology},\textsuperscript{157} Proclus uses his second version of B3 to explicate a passage from \textit{Laws}, and this use tends toward what I have called a “grandiose” reading of B3.\textsuperscript{158} And in the fragment’s other appearance in his commentary on \textit{Parmenides—}

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155 If, as seems likely, the theogony (i.e., the location of B13) preceded the account of perception, then—on the double-iteration hypothesis—the form of B3 that includes \textit{ἐκεῖ} would be the version found near B16, while our B3 would have been found earlier, describing—cf. Herodotus 6.86—the cognition of gods.

156 Between these two extremes there is plenty of room for Aristotelian epistemology, itself a variation of “the mind-being identity,” as demonstrated in Kahn, Thesis of Parmenides, \textit{art. cit.}, p. 723 (citing \textit{De Anima} 431a1 for \emph{ἐπιστήμη}, 431b17 for \emph{νοῦ̋}, and 425b26–426a26 for \emph{αἴσθησι̋}). As for Parmenides, his “Truth” transcends both of these extremes, along with the continuum between them.

157 \textit{Platonic Theology} 1.14 (lines 3–6): \textit{Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ νοῦ̋ οὗτο̋ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐστι νοῦ̋, ἐπεὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι, φησὶν ὁ Παρμενίδη̋, κατ ὰ μέθεξιν δὲ θεό̋ (ὅ μοι καὶ ὀ Αθηναῖο̋ ἐνδεικνύμενο̋ θεῖο̋ν αὐτὸ̋ν προσειπεῖν·... “ In other words, ‘if’ the Intellect we are talking about is \textit{the Intellect κατ’ οὐσίαν} \textit{[in accordance with \textit{Enneads} 5.1]}, then, ‘since’ B3 is true, that Intellect must also be God \textit{κατὰ μέθεξιν}, as indeed the Athenian Stranger says that it is when he says that \textit{νοῦ̋} is \textit{θεῖο̋} in \textit{Laws} 10 (see following note for what the Stranger actually says).

158 See \textit{Laws} 896e8–897b4. The Athenian Stranger’s point is that \textit{ἄγει ψυχὴ πάντα}, and after a cursory mention of things \textit{κατ’ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν}, he makes this point at ponderous length about both mundane mental and physical motions (\kappaινήσαι), finally concluding with: \textit{καὶ πᾶσιν ὃς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα ὥς θεὸν ὀρθῶ̋ θεοῖ̋, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα}. Proclus’ version plays down the Stranger’s claim that \textit{νοῦ̋} once soul has taken it on \textit{(προσλαβοῦσα)}, is “always God, rightly for the Gods” (whatever that means), by saying in his own voice (see previous note) only that \textit{νοῦ̋} is God “by participation,” and that the Athenian Stranger calls it merely “divine.” Here then is the paraphrase of Plato in \textit{Platonic Theology} 1.14, lines 6–8: \textit{νοῦ̋ γὰρ [φησιν] ἐκεῖνο̋ν προσλαβοῦσαν τὴν ψυχὴν ὥς θεό̋ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ}. In short, the words \textit{ἄγει ψυχὴ πάντα} (translated above) and \textit{πάντα} are deleted. The remainder of the sentence (lines 6–18) is too long to quote, but Proclus, unlike the Stranger, does not emphasize the mundane influences of \textit{ψυχη}, already suggested by his deletion of \textit{πάντα}. And in the sentence that follows (lines 18–25), the strictly somatic workings of soul, emphasized by the Athenian Stranger at \textit{Laws} 897a5–b1, are mentioned only by contrast with the kind of \textit{νοῦ̋} described by Aristotle in \textit{De Anima} 3.5. In short: if Proclus is correct that there is a connection between B3 and \textit{Laws} 897b1–2—and I think he is—then the Athenian Stranger’s use of it is incompatible with Parmenides’ “Truth,” apart, that is, from a grandiose reading of B3. For the Stranger’s thoughts on self-deification, see \textit{Laws} 818b7–d1.

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where he revisits Plotinus’ problem with Plato’s *Sophist*—Proclus endorses the reading for which Giancola argues. The difference between the Theophrastan and this Platonic context is revealing and fully exploits the ambiguity of εἶναι: the former favors a more generalized sense of “to be” in which all sentient life thinks merely because ‘whatever is’ thinks, while the latter, endorsed by Giancola—who naturally takes it for granted that B3 belongs in “Truth”—is that what ‘really is’ also thinks. Both of these may be called “objective” readings—distinguished from each other as “mystical” (or “divine”), and “mundane” (or “naturalistic”)—while a “subjective” reading starts with fact of human thinking, and thereby elevates us (hence the foregoing use of “grandiose”) to the level of what really is.

In addition to the passage in *Laws* where the Athenian Stranger may have used B3 to deify νοῦς even in its most mundane manifestations, Harold Cherniss discovered a clearer and more revealing echo of this “subjective reading” in Plato’s *Parmenides*, where Parmenides himself is made to repel young Socrates’ proposal that the unchanging realities the young man is calling “forms” are best

159 See Carlos Steel and Leen Van Campe (eds.). *Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria* III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009, pp. 149-151 (1152.14-1154.3). As in Plotinus, the Eleatic Stranger’s (once again identified with Plato himself; 1153.2) attribution of thinking to what completely is (as derived from B3, quoted as ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ νοέειν τε καὶ εἶναι at 1152.28) introduces motion into Being and therefore appears to contradict a number of earlier (διὰ δὲ τῶν προτέρων) passages from “Truth” (1153.6-8). Alluding to the Stranger’s own self-contradictory account (climaxing with συναμφότερα at *Spb*. 249d4), Proclus denies that Parmenides has been refuted, but might rather receive a “modifying addition” he calls a προσθήκη (1153.11-13): οὐδ’ ἂν ἐλεγχοιτο διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων τούτων ὁ Παρμενίδης, ἀλλὰ προσθήκην φιλοσοφία ἅλλη τῆς περὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς διατριβούσην. Proclus’ προσθήκη is then offered in 1153.14-1154.3, but it does nothing to palliate the text-imminent contradiction between the Eleatic Stranger’s use of B3, on the one hand, and B8.4, B8.30, and B8.26/B8.38, where Parmenides uses the crucial word ἀκίνητον, on the other.


161 It is “the religious-mystical view” in Giancola, *art. cit.*, pp. 635 and 648.

162 Harold Cherniss. *Parmenides and the Parmenides of Plato* (1932). In: Harold Cherniss. *Selected Papers*, edited by Leonardo Taran. Leiden: Brill, 1977, p. 281-297, on pp. 296-297: “The theory of Ideas as developed here into idealism [sc. Plato *Parmenides* 132b3-c11] would remind the reader of a hard saying of Parmenides himself: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοέειν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι. Whatsoever is the true meaning of that sentence, Plato would certainly feel that it was the outcome of that treacherous manipulation of the copulative verb; he does not want such meanings read into his doctrine; and in this passage Socrates is warned—and with true Platonic humor by Parmenides himself—that, if he should attempt such an escape from his difficulties, he would fall into the false doctrine of the Eleatics who confuse ‘Being’ and ‘Thinking’.” Moving B3 to “Doxa” eliminates the need for this form of “true Platonic humor”: naturally Parmenides would have no reason to regard B3 as true if he himself placed it in “Doxa.”
understood as thoughts (νοήματα). The fact that Plato would present Parmenides as rejecting this sense of B3 is highly suggestive, as is also the fact that it is the Eleatic Stranger, in defiance of Parmenides, who invokes the “mind-being identity” in order to introduce κίνησις into unmoved Being in Sophist 248c7-249a2, expressly described as ἀκίνητον at B8.26 and B8.38. But that is another story, albeit a not entirely unrelated one. For the present, it is both unnecessary and misleading to systematize a series of distinctions—“subjective” or “objective,” divine or merely mundane—that would re-enact, albeit no longer on the plane of “Truth,” the battle over any ‘proper’ doxastic reading of B3. The important thing is to reiterate the simple claim that is at the center of this paper: there is no compelling evidence that B3 belongs in “Truth” while B3’s intrinsic ambiguity—and its proven capacity to generate “two-headed” readings—suggests why it may truly belong in “Doxa,” where it can continue to seduce those whom the Goddess aptly called βροτοὶ δίκρανοι.

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163 Parmenides 132b3-c11. On this passage, see Charles H. Kahn. Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue: The Return to the Philosophy of Nature. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 13-14, especially “might appeal to many” (p. 13) and “others will find it attractive” (p. 14); these phrases justify the notion that Parmenides intended “Doxa” to seduce. Note that the rejection of a doxastic (and “subjective”) reading of B3 by Plato’s Parmenides justifies Plotinus’ use of ἀκριβέστερον (Enneads 5.1.8, line 25) in comparison with the implied acceptance—by both the Eleatic Stranger and the historical Parmenides according to Plotinus—of an “objective” reading of the fragment, which thereby creates the conflict, also noticed by Proclus, with ἀκίνητον.

164 The improbable notion that Plato’s Parmenides is attacking Parmenides likewise haunts Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, op. cit.; see pp. 28, 72, 92, 115, 139, 145, 147, 150, 153-4, 164, 168, 171, 203-4, 208, 212, 216-7, 218, 220, 230-31, 234, 240, and 243. Particularly germane is: p. 92 (cf. p. 230): “It may be noted that Plato’s Parmenides repudiates the doctrine which some critics ascribe to the real Parmenides that ‘to think is the same thing as to be’: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.” Hence arises the need for Cornford to embrace the Zeller reading of B3 (p. 34 n. 1).


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